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Engler v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. and Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress
Abstract
The rules governing negligent infliction of emotional distress claims differ significantly from state to state. The
predominant rule is the bystander recovery rule, which permits recovery by persons who are not physically
threatened by the defendant’s negligent conduct but who suffer emotional distress from witnessing injury to a
third person. In bystander recovery jurisdictions, the required degree of proximity of the plaintiff to the
accident scene, how the plaintiff hears about the accident, the plaintiff ’s relationship to the person actually
injured in the accident, and the proof required to establish severe emotional distress vary, sometimes
significantly, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The purpose of this Article is to review the response of Engler v.
Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. to the issue of whether a plaintiff in the zone of danger should be entitled to
recover damages for emotional distress arising from fear or anxiety for the safety of a third person, primarily
against the backdrop of the Minnesota experience with negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Part II
of this Article sets out the primary Minnesota emotional distress cases in order to provide a context for the
discussion of Engler in Part III. Part IV looks at the mechanics of applying Engler in the future. Part V is the
conclusion.
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The rules governing negligent infliction of emotional distress 
claims differ significantly from state to state.  The predominant rule 
is the bystander recovery rule, which permits recovery by persons 
who are not physically threatened by the defendant’s negligent 
conduct but who suffer emotional distress from witnessing injury to 
a third person.  In bystander recovery jurisdictions, the required 
degree of proximity of the plaintiff to the accident scene, how the 
plaintiff hears about the accident, the plaintiff’s relationship to the 
person actually injured in the accident, and the proof required to 
establish severe emotional distress vary, sometimes significantly, 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
The zone of danger rule, adopted in Minnesota in 1892 in 
Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway,1 was at one time the dominant 
approach to negligent infliction of emotional distress claims in the 
United States, but only a minority of jurisdictions adhere to that 
rule now.  The zone of danger rule requires proof that the plaintiff 
was physically threatened by the defendant’s negligence, feared for 
his own safety, and suffered severe emotional distress as a result.  
The Minnesota Supreme Court has tightened the zone of danger 
rules, requiring proof that the distress resulted in physical 
symptoms and, as a practical matter, that the proof be bolstered by 
medical testimony connecting the physical symptoms to the 
emotional distress. 
Until recently, one question the supreme court had not 
directly addressed was whether a plaintiff in the zone of danger 
should be entitled to recover damages for emotional distress arising 
from fear or anxiety for the safety of a third person.  The court 
resolved that issue in Engler v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.2  The 
purpose of this Article is to review Engler’s response to this issue, 
primarily against the backdrop of the Minnesota experience with 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.3  Part II of this 
Article sets out the primary Minnesota emotional distress cases in 
order to provide a context for the discussion of Engler in Part III.  
Part IV looks at the mechanics of applying Engler in the future.  Part 
V is the conclusion. 
 
 1. 48 Minn. 134, 139, 50 N.W. 1034, 1035 (1892). 
 2. 706 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Minn. 2005). 
 3. See generally Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in 
Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1993) (providing a detailed analysis of the 
law governing emotional distress in Minnesota through 1993). 
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II.   A SHORT HISTORY OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL 
DISTRESS IN MINNESOTA 
The following section is an abbreviated discussion of 
Minnesota emotional distress cases that will provide the context for 
the subsequent discussion of the Engler case.  The cases discussed 
span the past one hundred years.  Most of the cases involve 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, but not all.  The 
discussion includes two cases involving intentional infliction of 
emotional distress to determine the interrelationship, if any, 
between negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
law.  Each of the cases marks a key point in the development of the 
right to recover damages for emotional distress in Minnesota. 
A.  Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. 
In Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co., the plaintiff, 
along with his wife and daughter, was driving his carriage along a 
highway when his team of horses ran into a barb wire fence that the 
defendant had negligently placed on the highway.4  His horses 
became entangled in the fence wire, and so did he when he tried to 
free them.5  The horses were plunging and rearing and he told his 
wife to jump out of the carriage.6  At trial his counsel asked him if 
he suffered any mental anxiety for his family.7  He said that he 
feared not so much for himself as he did for his wife and daughter.8  
The issue on appeal was whether it was error to admit that 
evidence.9  The supreme court said that it was not reversible error 
to admit the evidence, but that in general, compensable mental 
distress and anxiety in a personal injury action has to be connected 
with physical injury to the person.10  The court thought that the 
evidence concerning the plaintiff’s anxiety for his wife and 
daughter would be inadmissible under that rule.11  Keyes appears to 
be the first Minnesota case involving the issue of whether damages 
may be awarded for fear for the safety of a third person.  It takes a 
restrictive view in indicating that recovery should not be allowed for 
 
 4. 36 Minn. 290, 291, 30 N.W. 888, 888 (1886). 
 5. Id. at 293, 30 N.W. at 889. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 292, 30 N.W. at 889. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 293-94, 30 N.W. at 889-90. 
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fear for a family member’s safety, even where the plaintiff is not 
only physically threatened, but actually suffers personal injury. 
B.  Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway 
Six years later, in 1892, in Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the zone of danger rule in a 
case where the plaintiff alleged that she suffered a miscarriage as a 
consequence of being involved in a near accident when the 
streetcar in which she was riding crossed the track of a cable-train 
line, almost colliding with a rapidly approaching cable train.12  She 
alleged that the imminence of the collision, ringing of alarm bells, 
and passengers rushing out of the car caused her nervous shock 
resulting in a miscarriage.13  The supreme court concluded that the 
fact the miscarriage was a product of nervous shock would not 
automatically be a superseding cause: 
Whether the natural connection of events was maintained, 
or was broken by such new, independent cause, is 
generally a question for the jury.  In this case the only 
cause that can be suggested as intervening between the 
negligence and the injury is plaintiff’s condition of mind, 
to-wit, her fright.  Could that be a natural, adequate cause 
of the nervous convulsions?  The mind and body operate 
reciprocally on each other.  Physical injury or illness 
sometimes causes mental disease, a mental shock or 
disturbance sometimes causes injury or illness of body, 
especially of the nervous system.  Now, if the fright was the 
natural consequence of—was brought about, caused by—
the circumstances of peril and alarm in which defendant’s 
negligence placed plaintiff, and the fright caused the 
nervous shock and convulsions and consequent illness, 
the negligence was the proximate cause of those injuries.  
That a mental condition or operation on the part of the 
one injured comes between the negligence and injury 
does not necessarily break the required sequence of 
intermediate causes.14 
C. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Village of Isle 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Village of Isle, a 
 
 12. 48 Minn. 134, 137, 50 N.W. 1034, 1034 (1892). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 138, 50 N.W. at 1035. 
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1963 Minnesota Supreme Court decision, also involved a bystander 
recovery issue, but in the context of a Civil Damage Act claim.15  It 
is a frequently cited decision because it delineated certain 
exceptions to the Minnesota zone of danger rules.  Because of the 
importance of those exceptions, the following discussion of the 
case is detailed. 
One of the issues in the case concerned the right of the 
plaintiff, who might be termed a remote bystander, to recover 
damages for mental anguish in a Civil Damage Act claim against 
the Village of Isle for the illegal sale of alcohol that contributed to 
permanent and disabling injuries, including brain damage, 
suffered by her husband in a car accident.16  In response to a 
question concerning the post-accident impact on her, the plaintiff 
testified she was nervous and worried all the time, and that she was 
unable to relax because she had to constantly watch her husband.17  
The plaintiff was not present at the scene of the accident involving 
her husband.18  All her emotional distress occurred later.19  The 
trial court in the case submitted the plaintiff’s claim for loss of 
means of support as well as mental anguish to the jury.20  The jury 
awarded the plaintiff damages for both loss of means of support 
and for injury to her person.21  On appeal, the supreme court held 
that the evidence was insufficient to support her claim for injury to 
her person.22  In what has become a standard statement in 
emotional distress cases in Minnesota,23 the court said: 
It is well established that damages for mental anguish or 
suffering cannot be sustained where there has been no 
accompanying physical injury . . . unless there has been 
some conduct on the part of defendant constituting a 
direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights such as that 
constituting slander, libel, malicious prosecution, 
seduction, or other like willful, wanton, or malicious 
 
 15. 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963). 
 16. See id. at 367-68, 122 N.W.2d at 43. 
 17. Id. at 367, 122 N.W.2d at 41. 
 18. Id. at 362, 122 N.W.2d at 38. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 367, 122 N.W.2d at 41. 
 23. E.g., Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 
557, 560 (Minn. 1996); M.H. v. Caritas Fam. Servs., 488 N.W.2d 282, 290 (Minn. 
1992); Covey v. Detroit Lakes Printing Co., 490 N.W.2d 138, 144 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1992). 
05STEENSON.DOC 5/31/2006  1:11:09 PM 
1340 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
misconduct.24 
Notwithstanding the frequent repetition of the phrase in the 
Minnesota cases, it is not entirely clear exactly what the court 
meant in suggesting that a plaintiff could recover for emotional 
harm absent physical injury if the defendant’s conduct is “willful, 
wanton, or malicious.”  The court cited four cases in support of that 
proposition: Larson v. Chase,25 Lesch v. Great Northern Railway Co.,26 
Purcell v. St. Paul City Railway Co.,27 and Beaulieu v. Great Northern 
Railway.28 
Larson was an 1891 case involving the mutilation and dissection 
of the plaintiff’s deceased husband’s body, in which the plaintiff 
had a legally protected interest.29  The plaintiff alleged that she 
suffered mental suffering and nervous shock as a result.30  In 
holding that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, the court 
recognized that mental suffering would be compensable if it is 
proximately caused by a “wrongful act” constituting “an 
infringement on a legal right.”31  As an example, the court noted 
that substantial damages could be recovered in a class of cases in 
which only mental injury is claimed, as in an assault case without 
physical contact, or in a false imprisonment action, even if 
“physically the plaintiff did not suffer any actual detriment.”32 
Lesch v. Great Northern Railway Co. was decided in 1906.33  The 
court considered the right of the plaintiff to recover for physical 
harm caused by emotional shock from a highly invasive trespass, 
including a search of her house and displacement of her personal 
belongings, by two railroad employees who were apparently looking 
for railroad property.34  The court’s statement of the facts notes 
that “[s]he was frightened by their acts, and immediately after they 
left she became sick, feverish, her head ached, she trembled, and 
had spells of vomiting.”35  She was confined to her bed for some two 
 
 24. Vill. of Isle, 265 Minn. at 367-68, 122 N.W.2d at 41 (emphasis added). 
 25. 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891). 
 26. 97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955 (1906). 
 27. 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). 
 28. 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907). 
 29. Larson, 47 Minn. at 308, 50 N.W. at 238. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 311, 50 N.W. at 240. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955 (1906). 
 34. Id. at 504-05, 106 N.W. at 956. 
 35. Id. at 505-06, 106 N.W. at 956. 
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weeks and “was not well for a considerable time afterwards.”36  The 
defendant argued that the fright suffered by the plaintiff was not 
the product of any legal wrong against her.37  Citing Purcell, the 
court said the law in Minnesota is “that there can be no recovery 
for fright which results in physical injury to the plaintiff, unless the 
fright is the proximate result of a legal wrong against the plaintiff 
by the defendant.”38  The court also noted that “[i]t is a matter of 
common knowledge that fright may, and often does, affect the 
nervous system to such an extent as to cause physical pain and 
serious bodily injury.”39 
The court noted that while the plaintiff’s husband had legal 
title to their home, she had an interest in it, and “[a]ny unlawful or 
wanton invasion of, or interference with, such right would be a 
legal wrong against her within the meaning of the rule, which is to 
be liberally construed and applied in cases where the defendant’s 
acts are wanton and ruthless.”40  The court held that the evidence 
was sufficient to establish that the defendant’s employees 
committed a tort when they invaded the plaintiff’s peaceful 
enjoyment of her home and interfered with her personal wearing 
apparel.41 
Beaulieu v. Great Northern Railway Co.,42 decided in 1907, 
involved a suit against a common carrier for breach of contract for 
failure to deliver the corpse of the plaintiff’s deceased child on 
time for his funeral.43  The plaintiff alleged the delay resulted in the 
deterioration of the corpse.44  The court noted that the issue of 
whether mental anguish is recoverable in either a contract or tort 
action has resulted in a substantial conflict of opinion.45  The court 
recognized that damages for mental anguish are recoverable in 
cases in which the plaintiff is physically injured by the defendant, 
or where the plaintiff has a claim for slander or malicious 
prosecution, or “in those willful wrongs where some legal right has 
been invaded, though no physical injury is inflicted or character or 
 
 36. Id. at 506, 106 N.W. at 956-57. 
 37. Id., 106 N.W. at 957. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 506-507, 106 N.W. at 957. 
 40. Id. at 506, 106 N.W. at 957. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907). 
 43. Id. at 48, 114 N.W. at 353. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 49, 114 N.W. at 353. 
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reputation assailed.”46  Beaulieu, in turn cited Purcell, Lesch, and a 
third case, Sanderson v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.47  Sanderson 
involved a claim by a mother for emotional harm from witnessing a 
train conductor attempting to put her children off a train because 
of her husband’s refusal to pay a half fare for their children, having 
made prior arrangements for them.48  As a result, she alleged that 
she suffered fright and shock, and her husband alleged that he 
incurred medical expenses.49  The trial court granted the 
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict on Mrs. Sanderson’s 
claim at the close of the evidence.50  The supreme court affirmed, 
holding that “there can be no recovery for fright which results in 
physical injuries, in the absence of contemporaneous injury to the 
plaintiff, unless the fright is the proximate result of a legal wrong 
against the plaintiff by the defendant.”51  There was no conduct 
constituting a legal wrong directed against the plaintiff in that case. 
In context, it seems clear that when the court in the State Farm 
case stated that recovery for mental anguish will be allowed where 
the defendant commits some other tort, slander, for example, or 
for “other like willful, wanton, or malicious misconduct,”52 the 
court is referring to a defined tort or interference with a legally 
protected interest of the plaintiff—not, as the terms “willful, 
wanton, or malicious”53 might imply, conduct that necessarily 
involves particularly egregious conduct by the defendant.  That 
degree of culpability is certainly not a necessary element of a libel 
or slander case, although that element may be involved in 
malicious prosecution cases, where malice is an essential element of 
the claim.54  It would also apply to other intentional torts—battery, 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. 88 Minn. 162, 163-64, 92 N.W. 542, 543 (1902). 
 49. Id. at 164, 92 N.W. at 543. 
 50. Id. at 164-65, 92 N.W. at 543. 
 51. Id. at 166, 92 N.W. at 544. 
 52. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Vill. of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 368, 122 
N.W.2d 36, 41 (1963). 
 53. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1020 (8th ed. 2004) defines “willful and wanton 
misconduct” as “[c]onduct committed with an intentional or reckless disregard for 
the safety of others, as by failing to exercise ordinary care to prevent a known 
danger or to discover a danger,” or “willful indifference to the safety of others.”  
The term willful misconduct is difficult to define, “but it is clear that it means 
something more than negligence.”  Id. (quoting FRANK L. MARAIST, ADMIRALTY IN A 
NUTSHELL 185-86 (3d ed. 1996)). 
 54. See Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (there 
must be proof that “(1) the action was brought without probable cause or 
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for example, where the supreme court has previously clearly held 
that a plaintiff is entitled to recover for emotional distress flowing 
from the battery, even absent any real physical harm, and where 
much of the claimed mental suffering and humiliation did not 
result in physical symptoms.55 
If “willful and wanton misconduct” is defined as “[c]onduct 
committed with an intentional or reckless disregard for the safety 
of others, as by failing to exercise ordinary care to prevent a known 
danger or to discover a danger,”56 or “willful indifference to the 
safety of others,”57 the potential exists for an expansion of the basic 
zone of danger rules in cases where the necessary degree of 
culpability on the part of the defendant can be established. 
Assume, for example, that the plaintiff is a bystander who 
suffers serious emotional distress after witnessing injury to a close 
family member caused by a defendant who has driven recklessly, 
perhaps while intoxicated, just to emphasize the defendant’s 
culpability.  Minnesota’s zone of danger rule would clearly bar 
recovery under a negligence theory.  The issue is whether the 
exception would kick in to permit recovery because of the reckless 
conduct of the defendant.  The supreme court’s opinion in Lickteig 
v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A. may support that 
proposition.58 
 
reasonable belief that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits; (2) the 
action must be instituted and prosecuted with malicious intent; and (3) the action 
must terminate in favor of [appellant]” (quoting Kellar v. VonHoltum, 568 
N.W.2d 186, 192 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)).  Seduction claims are of course no 
longer permitted.  See MINN. STAT. § 553.01 (2004). 
 55. See Smith v. Hubbard, 253 Minn. 215, 225, 91 N.W.2d 756, 764 (1958).  
The court of appeals decision in Johnson v. Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1988), shows how the concept works.  The plaintiff in the case sued for 
battery for an unwanted sexual advance—a kiss.  424 N.W.2d at 804.  The jury 
awarded him substantial compensatory damages.  Id. at 801.  He testified at trial 
that the kiss made him sick and upset, enough so that he related the incident to 
several friends.  Id. at 804.  The defendant argued that there was no evidence to 
corroborate the plaintiff’s claim of emotional harm.  Id. at 805.  However, the 
plaintiff’s confidants had testified that he was upset.  Id.  He also had a 
psychologist with expertise on victims of sexual harassment who assessed the 
plaintiff testimony that he suffered the kind of emotional and psychological 
trauma that can arise from such an incident.  Id.  The court of appeals found the 
evidence sufficient to justify the verdict, even though it did not meet the standards 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Id. at 804-05. 
 56. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 57. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 58. 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996).  Alternatively, the tightness of the rule 
creates the possibility that cases will be forced into the specific categories even if 
they may not belong there.  In Gooch v. North Country Regional Hospital, No. A05-
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D.  Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A. 
In Lickteig, a legal malpractice suit, the plaintiff claimed 
damages for emotional harm based on negligent 
misrepresentation, as found by an arbitrator.59  The plaintiff was 
obviously not in the zone of physical danger and did not suffer 
physical injury.60  The court held that “[d]amages for emotional 
distress could be justified only [if] the appellants violated [the 
plaintiff’s] rights by willful, wanton or malicious conduct.”61  The 
ordinary rule would be that the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
recover damages for emotional harm in a legal malpractice case, 
but Lickteig indicates that if the defendant’s conduct is egregious 
 
576, 2006 WL 771384 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2006), the plaintiffs sued the 
hospital for the loss of their stillborn fetus.  Id. at *1.  The plaintiffs sued for the 
hospital’s negligent and careless loss of the fetus.  Id. at *2.  The hospital argued 
that the plaintiff’s claim was in actuality a negligent infliction of emotional distress 
claim.  Id.  Had it been treated that way the plaintiffs would have lost the case 
because they were not in the zone of danger of any physical injury. 
  The trial court, following Lickteig, concluded the plaintiffs had to establish 
that the defendant’s conduct was willful and wanton in order to be entitled to 
recover for emotional harm.  Id. at *3.  The court of appeals held that the trial 
court correctly instructed the jury that “a person behaves willfully when he or she 
knows or has reason to know that an act is prohibited by a policy, rule, regulation, 
statute, or law and intentionally does it anyway,” but that the jury could not 
reasonably have found that the defendant acted willfully.  Id. (quoting 4A 
MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES—CIVIL 25.40 (4th ed. 1999)).  On 
the other hand, the court of appeals held the evidence was sufficient to establish 
that the defendant acted wantonly, which was defined as “[a]n act, or failure to act 
when there is a duty to do so, in reckless disregard of another’s rights, coupled 
with the knowledge that injury will probably result.”  Id. at *4 (quoting BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1014 (7th ed. 1999)). 
  The court considered prior Minnesota cases involving interference with 
dead bodies, but concluded that it is unclear “whether a claim for wrongful 
interference with a dead body can be supported by a showing of mere negligence, 
or whether it requires a showing of willful or wanton misconduct similar to an 
NIED case.”  Id. at *2.  The court attributed the lack of clarity in the law, in part, to 
the fact that earlier “cases arose before the evolution of the law that replaced many 
of the intentional torts with the developing rule of ‘negligence’ as the measure of 
the duty of care owed in tort.”  Id.  That is possible, although negligence theory 
had rounded out in Minnesota in the early twentieth century.  See O’Brien v. Am. 
Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012 (1910) (defective construction of 
public bridge).  More likely, the cases involving interference with dead bodies 
have simply been regarded as a unique category, given the likelihood that in this 
category of cases emotional harm is likely to arise.  See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. 
DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 54 
(5th ed. 1984). 
 59. 556 N.W.2d at 559. 
 60. Id. at 559-60. 
 61. Id. at 560. 
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enough recovery would be allowed.62  If the zone of danger 
requirement of actual physical danger is waived because of the 
defendant’s culpability, there should be no reason why a bystander 
would not be entitled to recover for emotional distress.  The 
question is whether the court really meant what it said, given the 
potential implications.  The source of the problem is the broad 
statement in State Farm. 
E.  Okrina v. Midwestern Corp. 
In Okrina v. Midwestern Corp.,63 in 1969, the plaintiff suffered a 
strong emotional reaction as the result of the collapse of a wall that 
was under construction as part of an addition being added to the 
store that the plaintiff was in at the time of the collapse.64  The 
plaintiff became sick and numb as a consequence, was hospitalized 
for five days, and thereafter continued to suffer from persistent and 
severe pain in her head, back, and leg.65  Her physician testified 
that, in addition to her pain, her personality changed and she 
became moody and introspective because of the fright she 
experienced because of the wall collapse.66  The court concluded 
that the plaintiff sustained a physical injury as a result of her mental 
anguish, that she feared for her own safety, and—to distance her 
claim from the plaintiff’s claim in the Village of Isle case—that “her 
distress was not occasioned by concern for the safety of others.”67  
The court concluded that her right to recover was supported by the 
evidence.68  While the defendant argued that the injury was not 
foreseeable, the court noted that “foreseeability is a test of 
negligence and not of damages,”69 and that if the defendant can 
foresee some harm to a person to whom the defendant owes a duty, 
it is unnecessary for the defendant to be able to foresee the exact 
nature and extent of the harm.70 
 
 
 62. Id. at 561-562. 
 63. 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969). 
 64. Id. at 401-02, 165 N.W.2d at 261. 
 65. Id. at 403, 165 N.W.2d at 262. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 404, 165 N.W.2d at 262 (discussing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Vill. of Isle, 265 Minn. 360, 122 N.W.2d 36 (1963)). 
 68. Id. at 405, 165 N.W.2d at 263. 
 69. Id. (citing Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 456, 107 N.W.2d 859, 862 
(1961)). 
 70. Id. 
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F. Stadler v. Cross 
 
The court specifically rejected the bystander recovery rule in 
1980, in Stadler v. Cross.71  The court’s rejection of that rule reflects 
its intent to establish limits on recovery that are “workable, 
reasonable, logical, and just as possible,”72 and its concern that a 
limit that is not susceptible to consistent and meaningful 
application by courts and juries would result in the arbitrary and 
capricious imposition of liability.73  The court remained 
unpersuaded “that the problems we see in limiting liability once it 
is extended beyond the zone of danger of physical impact can be 
justly overcome.”74  The court said that it did not consider as 
dispositive other factors typically advanced against bystander 
recovery, including “the fear of a proliferation of claims, the 
potential for fraudulent claims, the foreseeability of the injury, and 
unduly burdensome liability.”75 
G.  Langeland v. Farmers State Bank of Trimont 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has been clear that negligent 
infliction of emotional distress cases are limited to cases where the 
claimant is in the zone of physical danger.  In Langeland v. Farmers 
State Bank of Trimont, decided in 1982, the plaintiff landowners lost 
their right to redeem their farm from mortgage foreclosure due to 
the defendants’ misinterpretation of the redemption statute.76  The 
plaintiffs sought to recover for the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, in addition to other theories.77  The court noted that 
negligent infliction of emotional distress requires the claimant to 
have “been in some personal physical danger caused by the 
defendant’s negligence.”78  One of the striking aspects about this 
rather clear limitation on negligent infliction of emotional distress 
claims is how often the decision seems to be ignored.  Negligent 
infliction of emotional distress claims are routinely asserted in cases 
where the plaintiff is not in the zone of physical danger, and courts 
 
 71. 295 N.W.2d 552, 554-55 (Minn. 1980). 
 72. Id. at 554. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 555. 
 75. Id. at 555 n.3. 
 76. 319 N.W.2d 26, 28-29 (Minn. 1982). 
 77. Id. at 29. 
 78. Id. at 31. 
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dutifully cite Langeland and deny those claims.79 
H. Dornfeld v. Oberg 
The supreme court’s 1993 decision in Dornfeld v. Oberg involved 
a case that seemed to fit squarely in the zone of danger rules 
established by the court, with the added element that the plaintiff 
was claiming damages as a result of mental suffering caused by her 
husband’s death in an automobile accident in which she was also 
involved.80  The plaintiff’s husband was killed while changing a tire 
on their vehicle when he was hit by an intoxicated driver.81  The 
plaintiff was in the car at the time and felt an impact, according to 
the supreme court opinion.82  The court of appeals opinion stated 
she was “tossed around,”83 although she did not suffer any 
significant physical injury as a result of that impact.84  She did, 
however, claim that she began to suffer from post-traumatic stress 
syndrome/disorder (PTSS/PTSD), and that she suffered 
deterioration in her memory, was unable to retain a job, and had 
terrible nightmares because of the accident.85  A psychiatrist 
testified at trial that the PTSS was triggered by the accident.86  The 
plaintiff asserted both negligent and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claims.87  The jury found that she was in the zone 
of danger and that she reasonably feared for her own safety, but 
that her emotional distress did not arise out of that fear.88  The jury 
also found that the defendant Oberg’s extreme and outrageous 
 
 79. E.g., Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 
1998) (failure of psychiatric nurse to prevent abuse did not place plaintiff in zone 
of physical danger); Porter v. Children’s Health-Care Minneapolis, No. C5-98-
1342, 1999 WL 71470 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1999) (failure to immediately grant 
admission to emergency room); Schmidt v. HealthEast, No. C1-96-152, 1996 WL 
310032 (Minn. Ct. App. June 11, 1996) (denial of workers’ compensation claim); 
Anderson v. Morris Excavating, Inc., No. C5-95-404, 1995 WL 407436 (Minn. Ct. 
App. July 19, 1995) (trespass on property by workers performing maintenance 
work on a sewer line). 
 80. 503 N.W.2d 115 (Minn. 1993). 
 81. Id. at 116. 
 82. Id. at 117. 
 83. Dornfeld v. Oberg, 491 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), rev’d on 
other grounds, 503 N.W.2d 115 (Minn. 1993). 
 84. Id.  
 85. Dornfeld, 503 N.W.2d at 117. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 116 & n.1. 
 88. Dornfeld, 491 N.W.2d at 299. 
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driving was reckless.89  Those findings would seem to support the 
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  The plaintiff 
was in the zone of physical danger.  Even more, she actually 
suffered an impact, which presumably would entitle her to recover 
for all damages flowing from that impact.  That claim derailed, 
however, and ended up as a claim for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.90  Had the case arisen after Lickteig v. Alderson, 
Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A.,91 one wonders if the result would 
have been different, given the finding of reckless misconduct. 
In Dornfeld, the court of appeals held that when the supreme 
court adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
in Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc.,92 it did not change 
settled law that permits recovery for emotional harm by a person in 
the zone of danger.93  The court of appeals said that a plaintiff is 
still entitled to recover under section 46(2) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts,94 which permits recovery by a person who suffers 
severe emotional distress when the conduct of the tortfeasor is 
directed at a third person.95 
The supreme court distinguished the zone of danger cases 
because they arose under a theory of the tort of negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, not intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, and also because the negligence cases such as Stadler 
required proof of physical injury as a requirement.96  The plaintiff 
in Dornfeld did sustain physical injury, certainly, in the form of 
physical consequences flowing from the emotional distress.97  This 
would ordinarily satisfy the zone of danger proof requirement for 
physical symptoms arising from the emotional harm. 
The court, however, interpreted section 46(2) of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts98 to require an element of intent on the 
 
 89. Dornfeld, 503 N.W.2d at 117. 
 90. Id. at 120 (holding plaintiff could not recover for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress because the car’s driver had not directed his behavior at her 
and had not been aware of her presence). 
 91. 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996).  For a discussion of the case, see supra 
notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
 92. 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983). 
 93. Dornfeld, 491 N.W.2d at 300. 
 94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965). 
 95. Dornfeld, 491 N.W.2d at 300. 
 96. Dornfeld v. Oberg, 503 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Minn. 1993). 
 97. Id. at 117 (stating plaintiff complained of memory deterioration, inability 
to retain jobs, and terrible nightmares as a result of the accident). 
 98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965). 
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part of the defendant, and held that in order to find Oberg liable 
for the reckless infliction of emotional distress it would have to 
“find that his actions were intentionally ‘directed at’ [Dornfeld’s] 
husband,”99 and denied recovery on that basis.  Of course, intent is 
typically at the base of all negligent or reckless acts.  A person 
intends to drive at an excessive rate of speed, for example, and that 
creates a risk of injury to third persons; but for conduct to be 
reckless, it need not be directed toward any specific individual.  
The court in Dornfeld confused the intent requirement with the 
recklessness requirement.  It assumed that the requirement of an 
intentional act for reckless misconduct meant that the defendant 
Oberg had to have intended to hit the plaintiff’s husband in order 
for Oberg’s conduct to have been “directed at” the husband.100  
That is not what the recklessness standard means.  The Restatement 
clearly recognizes that a defendant may be liable for the reckless 
infliction of emotional distress by creating a high degree of 
probability that the distress will occur.101  This standard differs from 
intent cases where the defendant’s purpose is to cause the distress 
or where the defendant knows to a substantial degree of certainty 
that the distress would occur.  The court’s reading of the 
recklessness standard would effectively cut it out of the Restatement. 
The real question is why the zone of danger rule should have 
presented a barrier to recovery, particularly since the plaintiff was 
not only in the zone of danger, but also suffered a physical impact, 
even though the injuries were not significant.  If she sustained even 
minor injuries, she should have been entitled to recover for the 
damages that were directly caused by the accident. 
I.  K.A.C. v. Benson 
In K.A.C. v. Benson, the supreme court summarized the law 
governing negligent infliction of emotional distress in a case 
involving a claim by a patient against a physician with AIDS who 
performed a gynecological exam on her.102  The plaintiff sued 
 
 99. 503 N.W.2d at 119.  In Anderson, the court of appeals used Dornfeld’s 
analysis to conclude that the plaintiffs were not in the zone of danger of physical 
injury because the defendant’s conduct was directed toward their property.  
Anderson v. Morris Excavating, Inc., No. C5-95-404, 1995 WL 407436, at *2 (Minn. 
Ct. App. July 11, 1995). 
 100. See Dornfeld, 503 N.W.2d at 119-20. 
 101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. i. (1965). 
 102. 527 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Minn. 1995). 
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under a variety of theories, including negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.103  The court held that the plaintiff was not in 
the zone of danger for purposes of the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim.104 
Drawing on Stadler,105 the court first set out the standard 
elements of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, which 
require a plaintiff to show that she “(1) was within a zone of danger 
of physical impact; (2) reasonably feared for her own safety; and 
(3) suffered severe emotional distress with attendant physical 
manifestations.”106 
The court’s subsequent discussion deviated slightly from the 
standard elements from Stadler, however: 
 This court has limited the zone of danger analysis to 
encompass plaintiffs who have been in some actual 
personal physical danger caused by defendant’s 
negligence. Whether plaintiff is within a zone of danger is 
an objective inquiry. 
 Thus, cases permitting recovery for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress are characterized by a reasonable 
anxiety arising in the plaintiff, with attendant physical 
manifestation, from being in a situation where it was 
abundantly clear that plaintiff was in grave personal peril 
for some specifically defined period of time.  Fortune 
smiled and the imminent calamity did not occur.107 
The discussion prompts a question as to whether the supreme 
court intended to magnify the requirements for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress, although it seems reasonable to assume that 
the court was simply summarizing the kinds of cases where 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims have been 
successful.108 
J.  Navarre v. South Washington County Schools 
Where there is a statutory violation and the statute provides a 
 
 103. Id. at 557. 
 104. Id. at 560. 
 105. Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Minn. 1980). 
 106. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 557. 
 107. Id. at 558 (citations omitted). 
 108. The supreme court noted the added discussion in Wall v. Fairview Hospital 
& Healthcare Services, 584 N.W.2d 395, 408 (Minn. 1998).  The court of appeals 
repeated it in an unpublished decision, Graham v. Independent School District 625, 
No. A05-201, 2005 WL 3159742, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2005). 
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specific remedy, damages for emotional distress may be awarded 
even if the more stringent standards for negligent and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claims are not met.  In Navarre v. 
South Washington County Schools,109 a teacher sued a school district 
for violation of the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act 
because of its release of certain private personnel data concerning 
the teacher’s classroom management and instruction.110  She 
sought to recover for emotional harm because of the statutory 
violation.111  Relying on Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.112 and 
Gillson v. State Department of Natural Resources,113 the court of appeals 
stated broadly that “[i]n cases involving violation of a statutory 
right, emotional-distress damages are recoverable absent evidence 
of verifiable physical injury or severe emotional distress.”114  
Williams, an Eighth Circuit case, held that damages are to be 
presumed in a Title VII employment discrimination case where 
there is a violation of a substantive constitutional right.115  Gillson, a 
Minnesota Court of Appeals case involving a Minnesota Human 
Rights Act violation, held that damages for emotional harm may be 
awarded based solely on subjective testimony without a showing 
that the plaintiff’s pain and suffering was severe.116  The supreme 
court, in Navarre, somewhat obtusely distinguished both cases—
Williams because it involved the violation of a substantive 
constitutional right and Gillson because it involved discriminatory 
conduct similar to that in Williams.117  The supreme court further 
concluded, however, that the plaintiff was still entitled to recover 
damages for emotional harm for a violation of the Data Practices 
Act because of the broad remedy provision stating that an entity 
violating the Act “is liable to a person . . . who suffers any damage 
as a result of the violation.”118 
 
 109. 652 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 2002). 
 110. Navarre v. S. Wash. County Schs., 633 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001). 
 111. Id. 
 112. 660 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 113. 492 N.W.2d 835 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 114. Navarre, 633 N.W.2d at 54. 
 115. 660 F.2d at 1272. 
 116. 492 N.W.2d at 842. 
 117. Navarre v. S. Wash. County Schs., 652 N.W.2d 9, 29-30 (Minn. 2002). 
 118. Id. at 30 (citing MINN. STAT. § 13.08, subd. 1 (2004)).  In Scott v. 
Minneapolis Public Schools, Special District No. 1, No. A05-649, 2006 WL 997721 
(Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2006), the court of appeals seemed to read Navarre more 
broadly.  The case also involved a violation of the Minnesota Government Data 
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The court noted its traditional conservatism in cases involving 
damages awards for emotional harm, and also that the plaintiff in 
the case “failed to produce any verifiable medical or psychological 
evidence to support her claim,”119 although she did introduce 
evidence that the disclosure of the information caused her to be 
“extremely upset and caused her to be afraid to go out in public.”120  
The court held that while the evidence was conclusory and 
unsubstantiated by medical testimony, it was sufficient to justify 
submitting the claim for emotional damage to the jury.121  In a later 
opinion, the supreme court in Langeslag v. KYMN Inc.122 noted that 
the “appropriate method of proving the severity and causation of 
emotional distress is through medical testimony,”123 but made a 
point of stating that it did not intend to overrule Navarre.124  While 
Navarre should not be read broadly, given the supreme court’s 
traditionally cautious approach to cases involving claims for 
emotional harms, it does indicate that establishing a statutory cause 
of action may be one way to avoid the stringent damages 
requirements of the prevailing negligent and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress law. 
K.  Summary 
In summary, at the time the Engler case arose, the right to 
 
Practices Act.  The court cited Navarre for the proposition that “[m]edical-expert 
testimony is not a prerequisite to recovering damages for emotional distress.”  Id. 
at *6 (citing Navarre, 652 N.W.2d at 30).  The court cited Lickteig for the 
proposition that the plaintiff “must nonetheless ‘prove that emotional injury 
occurred under circumstances tending to guarantee its genuineness.’”  Id. at *6 
(quoting Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557, 
560 (Minn. 1996)).  The court’s subsequent discussion indicating that medical-
expert testimony is unnecessary to establish a claim for emotional distress seems to 
be generalized, and not limited solely to cases involving a violation of the 
Government Data Practices Act.  See id. at *6-*7.  The court in Lickteig, however, 
confines the seemingly broad statement made in Scott by noting that it is an 
exception to the general rules governing recovery for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.  556 N.W.2d at 560.  Suffice it to say that the supreme court’s 
subsequent decisions seem to impose the more rigid physical symptoms and 
medical evidence requirements as necessary conditions to guarantee the 
genuineness of emotional distress claims. 
 119. Navarre, 652 N.W.2d at 30. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. 664 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 2003).  For an in depth discussion of Langeslag, 
see infra notes 199-232 and accompanying text. 
 123. Id. at 870. 
 124. Id. at 870 n.9. 
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recover for emotional distress in Minnesota reduced to several 
mostly settled principles: 
1.  A plaintiff who sustains a physical injury is entitled to 
recover for the emotional harm flowing from that 
injury. 
2.  A plaintiff who does not suffer physical harm but is in 
the zone of danger of physical harm and who 
reasonably fears for his/her own safety is entitled to 
recover for severe emotional distress with attendant 
physical manifestations if appropriate medical evidence 
supports the distress and causation requirements. 
3.  A plaintiff who is not in the zone of danger of physical 
impact is entitled to recover damages for emotional 
harm if there is a direct invasion of the plaintiff’s 
rights, as in slander, libel, or malicious prosecution 
cases, or for other intentional torts, such as battery. 
4.  A plaintiff is also entitled to recover for other willful, 
wanton, or malicious misconduct.  The exact meaning 
of the term is unclear, although the most logical 
assessment is that it simply means that there is liability 
for emotional distress flowing from the commission of 
other torts, rather than from any conduct that may be 
labeled willful and wanton. 
5.  A plaintiff who asserts a statutory cause of action may 
be able to recover for emotional distress without 
proving physical symptoms and supporting medical 
evidence on the severity and causation issues. 
III.   ENGLER V. ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE CO. 
A.  The Facts 
Geralyn Engler and her two sons, Jacob and Jeffrey, were 
riding in a vehicle driven by Geralyn’s boyfriend, Brent Renner, 
when four-and-a-half year old Jeffrey said he had to go to the 
bathroom.125  Renner pulled the car to the side of the rural road 
they were driving down, and Jeffrey got out of the car and walked 
about thirty feet to the tree line by the road.126 
As Beverly Wehmas was driving down the road, nearing where 
 
 125. Engler v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 765-66 (Minn. 2005). 
 126. Id. at 766. 
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Renner’s car was stopped, she lost control of her vehicle, which 
veered toward Renner’s car and the tree line where Jeffrey was.127  
Engler first thought that the vehicle was going to hit her, but then 
she realized that it was going to strike Jeffrey instead.128  She 
screamed and turned away just before he was hit by Wehmas’ 
vehicle.129  She rushed to Jeffrey and carried him back to Renner’s 
car.130  Jeffrey was seriously injured in the accident and spent four 
days in intensive care.131  He was scarred as a result of the 
accident.132 
Engler stated in her deposition that “she sought medical 
treatment a few months after the accident because she ‘did not feel 
like herself.’”133  She was also “irritable, did not want to get out of 
bed, cried frequently, and had lost all ambition.”134  She was 
diagnosed by her physician with PTSS and depression.135  The 
physician prescribed antidepressants for her.136 
Engler sued Wehmas, asserting a claim of negligent infliction 
of emotional distress.137  The district court denied the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment and certified to the court of appeals 
the issue of whether the plaintiff was entitled to “recover damages 
for emotional distress caused by her fear for the safety of her son 
and from witnessing her son’s injuries,” when she was “in the ‘zone 
of danger’ of physical impact, . . . experienced a reasonable fear for 
her own safety,” and “demonstrated physical manifestations of 
emotional distress.”138 
The court of appeals, one judge dissenting, held that she was 
not entitled to recover.139  There was no dispute over the issue of 
whether the plaintiff would be entitled to recover for damages 
based on her fear for her own safety,140 but the court of appeals—
relying on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Stadler v. 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Engler v. Wehmas, 633 N.W.2d 868, 870-71 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 139. Id. at  873. 
 140. Id. at 872. 
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Cross141 and its own decision in Carlson v. Illinois Farmers Insurance 
Co.142—held that she was not entitled to recover damages arising 
out of fear for the safety of her son or from witnessing her son’s 
injuries.143  The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review, but the 
parties settled the suit against Wehmas for $50,000, Wehmas’ 
insurance policy limit.144  The plaintiff claimed that her damages 
exceeded the settlement amount and then brought a claim against 
her own automobile insurance company, Illinois Farmers, seeking 
to recover under her underinsured motorist coverage.145 
The issue concerning the scope of recoverable damages was 
 
 141. 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1980). 
 142. 520 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).  The plaintiff in the case was one 
of four young adults who were involved in a one-car rollover accident in which she 
sustained serious injuries and her best friend was killed instantly.  Id. at 535.  She 
settled her claims against the driver and, because her damages exceeded the 
amount of the settlement, she brought suit against her insurer—Illinois Farmers—
to recover underinsured motorist insurance benefits.  Id.  She sought to recover 
damages for her own personal injuries, the emotional distress that resulted from 
those injuries, as well as emotional distress that resulted from witnessing her best 
friend’s death.  Id.  The trial court granted the defendant partial summary 
judgment on her claim for emotional distress for witnessing the death of her best 
friend.  Id.  The plaintiff appealed and the court of appeals affirmed.  Id. at 535, 
538. 
  The plaintiff admitted that this part of her claim did not arise out of 
physical injury.  Id. at 536.  Instead of arguing that she was in the zone of danger 
and all her emotional harm was related to her physical injuries in the accident, she 
argued that her claim was “covered by a new cause of action which allows recovery 
for negligently inflicted emotional distress without attendant physical harm as 
long as the surrounding circumstances suggest the distress is genuine.”  Id. at 536-
37.  
  The court of appeals rejected the claim in part because of the lack of an 
allegation of physical manifestations arising out of the emotional distress and in 
part because it concluded that the defendant owed no duty to her to guard against 
the risk of emotional harm from witnessing the death of her friend, stating: 
While the tortfeasor had a duty to protect both Carlson and her friend 
from physical harm because they were passengers in his car, he had no 
duty to protect Carlson from distress arising from the fate of her friend.  
To hold otherwise would impose on a negligent tortfeasor liability out of 
proportion to his culpability. 
Id. at 537. 
  The court treated her claim as a bystander recovery claim.  Id. at 538.  
Because her claim for emotional harm from witnessing her friend’s death was 
unrelated to her own personal injuries, the court saw her as in the same position 
as the plaintiff bystanders in Stadler, and that her physical injuries were no 
indication of the reliability of her claim for emotional harm.  Id. 
 143. Engler, 633 N.W.2d at 873. 
 144. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Minn. 2005). 
 145. Id. 
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raised at the district court level.146  The court held that Engler was 
not entitled to recover damages for emotional distress from fear for 
her son’s safety or witnessing her son’s injury.147  The court of 
appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion148 and the supreme 
court reversed.149 
B.  The Briefs 
The statement of facts in the appellant’s brief said that when 
Engler first saw her son she believed he was dead, and that 
[a]s a result of experiencing this harrowing event, Ms. 
Engler began experiencing symptoms of emotional 
distress.  Most of her symptoms were in response to 
witnessing, helplessly, what happened to Jeffrey, including 
the effects of seeing his small, bloodied, lifeless body in 
the ditch.  Emotionally she was out of control.  She had 
difficulty coping with day-to-day responsibilities.  She was 
diagnosed with, and continues to suffer from, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and depression as a 
direct result of this incident.  Her symptoms of PTSD 
currently include: anxiety, overprotectiveness, fear, 
nightmares, flashbacks, a 70 lb.+ weight gain and 
uncontrollable feelings of sadness.  She has also been 
depressed since the accident, resulting in symptoms of 
irritability, decrease in sexual desire and lack of 
sociability.150 
The brief made a point of emphasizing that most of the 
emotional harm the plaintiff suffered was a result of witnessing the 
injury to her son, rather than fear for her own safety. 
The issue as framed in the appellant’s brief was whether a 
plaintiff who is in the zone of danger of physical impact, 
experiences reasonable fear for her own safety, and demonstrates 
physical manifestations of emotional distress may “also recover 
damages for emotional distress caused by her fear for the safety of 
her son and from witnessing her son’s injuries.”151  The brief made 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., No. A04-1445, 2005 WL 704100, at *1 
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2005). 
 149. Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 772. 
 150. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 5, Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 
N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005) (No. A04-1445). 
 151. Id. at 1. 
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a straightforward argument that the basic elements of a negligent 
infliction of emotional distress claim were met, and that the 
plaintiff should therefore be entitled to recover for all the damages 
proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence,152 relying on the 
supreme court’s classical statement in 1896 in Christianson v. 
Chicago St. Paul M & O Railway Co.153 
If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a 
particular act would or might result in any injury to 
anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent 
at all; but, if the act itself is negligent, then the person 
guilty of it is equally liable for all its natural and proximate 
consequences, whether he could have foreseen them or 
not.  Otherwise expressed, the law is that if the act is one 
which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to 
have anticipated was liable to result in injury to others, 
then he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from 
it, although he could not have anticipated the particular 
injury which did happen.154 
The appellant also argued that the plaintiff had to meet a 
heavy burden of proof in establishing the elements of a negligent 
infliction of emotional distress claim in Minnesota,155 and that 
limiting the plaintiff’s right to recover to only those damages 
caused by fear for her own safety would create “an unprecedented, 
unrealistic, and impossible standard that in no way reflects the full 
measure of the emotional distress caused by the tortfeasor’s 
negligence.”156 
The statement of facts in the brief for the respondent 
understated the nature of her injuries: 
Appellant testified that while at first she thought that 
the Wehmas vehicle was going to hit her, Jacob and Brent 
Renner, she also testified that it happened so quickly she 
really didn’t have an estimation as to how long she herself 
was in fear. 
Appellant testified that it was a couple of months after 
the accident that she sought medical treatment for her 
own symptoms, i.e., post-traumatic stress.  Appellant 
 
 152. Id. at 11. 
 153. 67 Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896). 
 154. Id. at 97, 69 N.W. at 641 (quoted in Appellant’s Brief, supra note 150, at 
11). 
 155. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 150, at 9. 
 156. Id. at 15. 
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testified that she sought medical treatment because she 
would cry all the time for no reason, couldn’t get out of 
bed and was irritable.  Appellant testified she didn’t feel 
like herself, she couldn’t function normally and didn’t 
have any ambition.157 
The argument against permitting recovery for fear for 
another’s safety by a person in the zone of danger was based in part 
on the lack of Minnesota precedent and in part on the concerns 
the Minnesota Supreme Court expressed in 1980 in Stadler v. 
Cross,158 when it rejected bystander recovery because of concerns 
about limiting the persons who would be entitled to recover under 
that theory.159  The brief also argued that the law in other 
jurisdictions supported denial of recovery also, including a 
reference to an American Law Reports Annotation,160 asserting that 
four states—Minnesota, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Virginia—deny 
recovery for emotional distress caused by witnessing negligent 
injury to another, although the cases do not support that 
proposition.161 
Focusing on bystander recovery jurisdictions, the brief argued 
that permitting recovery for one in the zone of danger who fears 
for the safety of another would create the same problems that have 
existed in California, where bystander recovery rules have shifted as 
the California Supreme Court has struggled to define appropriate 
limits for persons seeking to recover because of emotional distress 
suffered in witnessing injuries to third persons.162 
The amicus brief submitted on behalf of the Minnesota Trial 
Lawyers Association (MTLA) also argued that “fear for one’s own 
safety” is only appropriate for purposes of determining whether a 
claimant was within the “zone of danger” created by the accident, 
but that once the plaintiff satisfies that standard, “fear for one’s 
 
 157. Respondent’s Brief and Appendix at 5, Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 
N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005) (No. A04-1445). 
 158. 295 N.W.2d 552, 554-55 (Minn. 1980). 
 159. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 157, at 7-10. 
 160. Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Recovery Under State Law for Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress Due to Witnessing Injury to Another Where Bystander 
Plaintiff Must Suffer Physical Impact or Be in Zone of Danger, 89 A.L.R. 5th 255 (2001).  
The annotation specifically says that the four jurisdictions “do not allow recovery 
under any circumstances for emotional distress caused by witnessing negligent 
injury to another.”  Id. § 2a.  Suffice it to say that the cases the annotation cites do 
not support that proposition. 
 161. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 157, at 13. 
 162. Id. at 15-19. 
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own safety” should be rejected as a test for damages.163  Instead, the 
brief argued, “damages should reasonably include all harm 
proximately caused by the negligence of the tortfeasor.”164  The 
MTLA brief stressed, as did the Appellant’s brief, that it was not 
seeking any change in the existing standards used to determine 
whether a person in the zone of danger is entitled to recover.165 
Much of the MTLA brief focused on the propriety of using 
“fear for one’s safety” as the standard for damages in cases where 
emotional harm is caused by witnessing injury to another.166  The 
brief argued that the standard is inadequate for a variety of reasons, 
including the illogic of focusing on only one form of a complex 
emotional reaction to a traumatic event.167 
The issue as framed in the Minnesota Defense Lawyers 
Association (MDLA) amicus brief was “[s]hould Minnesota 
recognize an entirely new cause of action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress for bystanders who experience emotional 
distress as a result of fear for the safety of another?”168  The brief 
argued that not only does Minnesota law not recognize bystander 
claims, but that to do so would result in an undue expansion of 
liability through the application of a standard that has proven 
difficult to administer.169  The brief relied heavily on bystander 
recovery cases in constructing the argument.170 
C.  The Opinion 
The supreme court noted that the issue of “whether a person 
who is in the zone of danger and who fears both for his or her own 
safety and for the safety of another may recover for distress caused 
by fearing for the other’s safety or witnessing the other’s injury” is a 
 
 163. Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Trial Lawyers 
Association at 1, Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005) (No. 
A04-1445). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 2. 
 166. Id. at 17-26. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Brief of Amicus Curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association at 1, 
Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005) (No. A04-1445). 
 169. Id. at 11-18. 
 170. Id. (citing Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 523-24 
(Cal. 1963); Resavage v. Davies, 86 A.2d 879 (Md. 1952); Okrina v. Midwestern 
Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 404-06, 165 N.W.2d 259, 263 (1969); Iacona v. Schrupp, 521 
N.W.2d 70, 73 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994); Carlson v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 520 N.W.2d 
534, 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)). 
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question of first impression in Minnesota.171  The court began its 
analysis of the issue with a standard analysis of the three primary 
rules courts have adopted to resolve claims for emotional harm by 
bystanders who have witnessed another’s peril or injury: the impact, 
zone of danger, and bystander recovery rules.172 
The bystander recovery rule, based on variations of the 
California Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Dillon v. Legg,173 is the 
most commonly accepted rule, adopted by some twenty nine states, 
according to the court’s count in Engler.174  The impact rule is still 
followed by three jurisdictions and the zone of danger rule by 
ten.175  The numbers vary, depending on who does the counting, 
but the predominant rule is the bystander recovery rule.176 
 
 171. Engler , 706 N.W.2d at 768. 
 172. Id. at 768-70. 
 173. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). 
 174. Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 769. 
 175. Id. at 768-69. 
 176. Breakdown of States Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress: 
I. No test for NIED (2 total jurisdictions).   
Jurisdictions not recognizing NIED:   
Gideon v. Norfolk S. Corp., 633 So. 2d 453, 454 (Ala. 1994) (per 
curium); Mech. Lumber Co. v. Smith, 752 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Ark. 
1988). 
II. Direct impact test (6 total). 
Jurisdictions recognizing NIED for bystander recovery and 
applying the physical (or direct) impact rule.  This rule requires 
that a plaintiff seeking damages for emotional injury stemming 
from a negligent act must have also contemporaneously sustained 
a physical impact or injury due to the defendant’s conduct: 
Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 82, 85 (Ga. 2000); 
Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 464 (Idaho 
1996); Anderson v. Scheffler, 752 P.2d 667, 669 (Kan. 1988); 
Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141, 146 (Ky. 1980); Kraszewski v. 
Baptist Med. Ctr. of Okla., 916 P.2d 241, 247-48 (Okla. 1996); 
Hammond v. Cent. Lane Commc’n Ctr., 816 P.2d 593, 597 (Or. 
1991). 
III. Zone of Danger Tests (13 total). 
1.  Zone of Danger jurisdictions stating that a negligent infliction of 
emotional distress cause of action requires the plaintiff to (1) 
witness an injury to a closely related person, (2) suffer mental 
anguish manifested as physical injury, and (3) be within the zone 
of danger so as to be subject to an unreasonable risk of bodily 
harm created by the defendant (whether the plaintiff must also be 
found to be in reasonable fear for his/her own safety at the time 
of the accident is indicated in parenthesis): 
Pierce v. Casas Adobes Baptist Church, 782 P.2d 1162, 1165 
(Ariz. 1989); Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164-65 (Colo. 
1978); Nutt v. A.C. & S., Inc., 466 A.2d 18, 24 (Del. Super. Ct. 
05STEENSON.DOC 5/31/2006  1:11:09 PM 
2006] ENGLER V. ILLINOIS FARMERS INSURANCE CO. 1361 
 
1983); William v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C. 1990) 
(requiring plaintiff also fear for his/her own safety); Rickey v. 
Chi. Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill. 1983) (requiring 
plaintiff also fear for his/her own safety); Resavage v. Davies, 86 
A.2d 879 (Md. 1952); Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 
764, 770-71 (Minn. 2005) (requiring plaintiff also fear for 
his/her own safety); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 461 N.E.2d 843, 848 
(N.Y. 1984); Nielson v. AT & T Corp., 597 N.W.2d 434, 441 
(S.D. 1999); Vaillancourt v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 425 
A.2d 92, 95 (Vt. 1980) (requiring plaintiff also fear for his/her 
own safety). 
2.  Zone of Danger jurisdictions where the victim does not have to 
prove mental anguish as manifested by a physical injury (the 
simple zone of danger test, but all other factors stay the same): 
Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Mem’l Hosp., 799 S.W.2d 595, 599-
600 (Mo. 1990) (requiring plaintiff also fear for his/her own 
safety); Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684-685 
(N.D. 1972) (requiring plaintiff also fear for his/her own 
safety); Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236, 240 (Utah 
1992) (requiring plaintiff also fear for his/her own safety). 
IV. The Foreseeability Jurisdictions (30 total).  These jurisdictions follow 
modified versions of the Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) 
foreseeability doctrine: 
1.  These jurisdictions require that (1) the NIED plaintiff is closely 
related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury 
producing event at the time it occurs and is aware that it is causing 
injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional 
distress—a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a 
disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to 
the circumstances.  (This test is from Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 
814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989), which modified Dillon): 
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989); Fineran v. 
Pickett, 465 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Iowa 1991); Nelson v. Flanagan, 
677 A.2d 545, 548 (Me. 1996); Satchfield v. R.R. Morrison & 
Son, Inc., 872 So. 2d 661, 664 (Miss. 2004); Buck v. Greyhound 
Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 437, 443 (Nev. 1989); Graves v. Estabrook, 
818 A.2d 1255, 1259 (N.H. 2003); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 
528 (N.J. 1980); Folz v. State, 797 P.2d 246, 260 (N.M. 1990);  
Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1052 (R.I. 1994) (requiring 
physical manifestation/injury of emotional distress); Kinard v. 
Augusta Sash & Door Co., 336 S.E.2d 465, 467 (S.C. 1985) 
(requiring physical manifestation/injury of emotional distress); 
Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (Va. 1973) (requiring 
physical manifestation/injury of emotional distress); Heldreth v. 
Marr, 425 S.E.2d 157, 162 (W. Va. 1992). 
2. Jurisdictions that follow the Dillon (as modified by Thing) 
foreseeability doctrine, but do not require the NEID plaintiff to be 
at the scene of the accident, but often requiring the plaintiff to 
arrive shortly thereafter: 
Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 865 (Conn. 1996); Zell v. 
Meek, 665 So. 2d 1048, 1054 (Fla. 1995) (requires a physical 
manifestation/injury of the emotional distress); Lejeune v. 
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Adopting the bystander recovery rule would have been one 
solution to the issue the court faced in Engler, but the appellant 
certainly was not asking the court to adopt that rule.  Nonetheless, 
the court took the opportunity to note that it had soundly rejected 
the bystander rule in Stadler.177  The court said that the advantage of 
the zone of danger rule is that it “provides a bright line to limit 
recovery,” and avoids the problems of potentially unlimited liability 
and the absence of clear standards associated with the bystander 
recovery rule,178 even though the proliferation of claims was 
specifically noted by the Stadler court as a non-factor in its 
decision.179 
 
Rayne Branch Hosp., 556 So. 2d 559, 570 (La. 1990); 
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (Mass. 1978) 
(requiring physical manifestation/injury of emotional distress); 
Wargelin v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 385 N.W.2d 732, 735 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring physical manifestation/injury 
of emotional distress); Vosburg v. Cenex-Land O’Lakes 
Agronomy Co., 513 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Neb. 1994); Paugh v. 
Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766-67 (Ohio 1983); Ramsey v. Beavers, 
931 S.W.2d 527, 531 (Tenn. 1996); Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 787 
P.2d 553, 557 (Wash. 1990). 
3. Jurisdictions that apply the foreseeability doctrine without 
reference to the seriousness, severity, or physical manifestation of 
the plaintiff’s emotional distress, only requiring that the plaintiff’s 
mental anguish be of a kind normally suffered by a reasonable 
person.  The plaintiff must still (1) have actually witnessed or 
come on the scene (2) soon after the death or severe injury of a 
loved one (3) with a relationship to the plaintiff analogous to a 
spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, or sibling caused 
by the defendant’s negligent or otherwise tortious conduct: 
Croft v. Wicker, 737 P.2d 789, 791-92 (Alaska 1987); Groves v. 
Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569, 573 (Ind. 2000) (calling for a “direct 
involvement” standard); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 685 (Pa. 
1979); Freeman v. City of Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923, 923-24 
(Tex. 1988); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 
432, 445 (Wis. 1994); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 200-01 
(Wyo. 1986). 
V. The “pure” foreseeability test (3 total). 
  These jurisdictions only require that serious mental distress to the 
plaintiff was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the 
defendant’s negligent act: 
Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 521 (Haw. 1970); Sacco v. 
High Country Indep. Press, Inc., 896 P.2d 411, 425 (Mont. 
1990); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Ass’n, 395 
S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 1990). 
 177. Engler, 707 N.W.2d at 770 (citing Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554-55 
(Minn. 1980)). 
 178. Id. at 771. 
 179. Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 555 n.3. 
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The court in Stadler, however, did not resolve the damages 
issue the court faced in Engler.  On that issue the court in Engler 
held that “a plaintiff may recover damages for distress caused by 
fearing for another’s safety or witnessing serious injury to 
another”180 if the plaintiff proves she “(1) was in the zone of danger 
of physical impact; (2) had an objectively reasonable fear for her 
own safety; (3) had severe emotional distress with attendant 
physical manifestations; and (4) stands in a close relationship to 
the third-party victim.”181 
The court then added a fifth requirement: “the plaintiff also 
must establish that the defendant’s negligent conduct—the 
conduct that created an unreasonable risk of physical injury to the 
plaintiff—caused serious bodily injury to the third-party victim.”182   
Later in the opinion, the court held that the requirement is “either 
death or serious bodily injury” to the victim.183 
1.  Zone of Danger of Physical Impact 
The plaintiff must be in the zone of danger of physical 
impact,184 which seriously limits the utility of zone of danger cases, 
effectively limiting it to accident cases.  The plaintiff must have 
been in “some actual personal physical danger caused by” the 
negligence of the defendant.185  It is an objective inquiry.186  In 
K.A.C. v. Benson,187 the Minnesota Supreme Court denied a 
plaintiff’s claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress based 
on an invasive physical examination performed on her by a 
physician suffering from AIDS.188  The K.A.C. court held that “a 
remote possibility of personal peril is insufficient to place plaintiff 
 
 180. Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 770. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 770-71. 
 183. Id. at 772.  The Engler court followed the New York Court of Appeals 
decision in Bovson v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219 (N.Y. 1984).  706 N.W.2d at 771-72. 
 184. See Langeland v. Farmers State Bank of Trimont, 319 N.W.2d 26, 32 
(Minn. 1982) (noting that, in Minnesota, the only exception to the physical injury 
requirement “occurs in cases involving a direct invasion of the plaintiff’s rights 
such as defamation, malicious prosecution, or other willful or malicious 
conduct”). 
 185. K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Minn. 1995). 
 186. Id. (citing Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554-55 (Minn. 1980)). 
 187. 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995).  For a discussion of the case see supra 
notes 102-08 and accompanying text. 
 188. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 555.  The plaintiff was not physically injured from 
the examinations.  Id. at 558. 
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within a zone of danger for purposes of a claim of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.”189  The plaintiff must have been “in 
some actual personal physical danger caused by defendant’s 
negligence.”190  A plaintiff’s reasonable fear that she is in the zone 
of danger would be insufficient if she was not actually in peril of 
physical harm.191 
2.  Objectively Reasonable Fear for One’s Own Safety 
The plaintiff’s claim for fear for her own safety must be 
objectively reasonable.  Framed slightly differently, the plaintiff’s 
anxiety must be a reasonable response to the event.192 
3.  Severe Emotional Distress with Attendant Physical Manifestations 
To substantiate her claim, the plaintiff must prove “severe 
emotional distress with attendant physical manifestations.”193  Engler 
does not, however, require that those physical manifestations flow 
from the plaintiff’s fear for her own safety.194  By framing the 
requirement that way, the court avoided the problems that would 
be involved if a trier of fact were required to determine which 
emotional reaction, fear for the plaintiff’s own safety or witnessing 
injury to a third person, caused the physical manifestations. 
A second question concerns the standards for proof of severe 
emotional distress.  Severe emotional distress is required for both 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims in 
Minnesota.195  One of the issues in construing the requirement 
concerns the relationship between the two theories.  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the independent tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress for the first time in 1983, 
in Hubbard v. United Press International, Inc.,196 but the court severely 
limited the terms and conditions of recovery.197  This has paved the 
way for a steady stream of summary judgments on the issue, either 
because the plaintiff’s allegations failed to establish extreme and 
 
 189. Id. at 559. 
 190. Id. at 558. 
 191. See Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236, 241 (Utah 1992). 
 192. K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 559. 
 193. Id. at 557. 
 194. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 770-71 (Minn. 2005). 
 195. E.g., K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 557, 560. 
 196. 330 N.W.2d 428, 438 (Minn. 1983). 
 197. Id. at 438-39. 
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outrageous conduct, allegations of the severity of the emotional 
distress were insufficient, or the evidence of causation between the 
defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s distress was inadequate.  
Negligent infliction of emotional distress of course does not 
require extreme and outrageous conduct, but it does require a 
showing of severe emotional distress caused by the defendant’s 
negligence.198  The issue is whether the restrictive cast given to the 
severe emotional distress requirement by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court applies in negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. 
Langeslag v. KYMN Inc.,199 the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
most recent decision on the issue, illustrates the rigidity of the 
court’s approach to intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claims.  The case arose out of a highly acrimonious employment 
relationship between the plaintiff and the principal owner of a 
radio station.200  The plaintiff sued the radio station and principal 
owner, Eddy, under an impressive array of theories, including 
“breach of contract, violation of Minnesota’s whistle-blower 
statute,201 sexual harassment, reprisal, and [sic] aiding and abetting 
in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA),202 failure 
to pay wages, assault, intentional interference with contract, 
retaliation for serving a complaint, violation of Minnesota’s equal 
pay act,203 wrongful and retaliatory termination, defamation and 
slander.” 204 
“Eddy counterclaimed, alleging intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, defamation, and intentional interference with a 
contractual relationship.”205  The procedure was complicated, but 
in the end the jury found in favor of the employer, Eddy, on the 
plaintiff’s claims against him, except for the whistle-blower and 
Minnesota Human Rights Act claims.206  The jury also found in his 
favor on all three of his counterclaim theories, awarding him 
$535,000 for his claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.207  In a subsequent bench trial, the court found in favor of 
 
 198. E.g., K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 557-58. 
 199. 664 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 2003). 
 200. Id. at 862-63. 
 201. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2002). 
 202. Id. § 363.03(1), (2), (6), (7). 
 203. Id. § 181.66-.71. 
 204. Langeslag, 664 N.W.2d at 863. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id at 863-64. 
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Eddy on the plaintiff’s whistle-blower and Minnesota Human 
Rights Act claims.208  The supreme court granted review to consider 
only Eddy’s intentional infliction of emotional distress 
counterclaim against the plaintiff.209  The court reversed.210 
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is an independent 
tort.  The standard elements, as established in Hubbard v. United 
Press International, Inc.,211 are extreme and outrageous conduct that 
is intentional or reckless and that causes severe emotional 
distress.212  Hubbard cautioned that the tort should be “sharply 
limited to cases involving particularly egregious facts,”213 and that a 
plaintiff asserting the claim would have to meet a “high threshold 
standard of proof.”214  Taking Hubbard as its test, the court in 
Langeslag held that Eddy’s claim failed both because Langeslag’s 
conduct was not extreme and outrageous and because Eddy’s proof 
that Langeslag’s conduct caused his emotional distress was 
insufficient.215 
The standard for determining whether conduct is extreme and 
outrageous is whether it is “utterly intolerable to the civilized 
community.”216  The supreme court in Langeslag dissected each 
alleged incident, which included filing false police reports, threats 
to take legal action, and frequent workplace arguments; and the 
court held that each incident was insufficient to justify recovery.217 
Most relevant to this Article is the court’s conclusion that 
Eddy’s evidence of severe emotional distress was insufficient to 
justify recovery.  The court applied the “high threshold” standard 
to the issue of whether the distress was severe.218  The facial test is 
whether the distress is so severe that no reasonable person could be 
expected to endure it.219 
There was a de novo review of the district court’s decision to 
deny Langeslag’s motion for JNOV.220  The court noted that the 
 
 208. Id. at 864. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 870. 
 211. 330 N.W.2d 428 (Minn. 1983). 
 212. Id. at 438-39. 
 213. Id. at 439. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Langeslag, 664 N.W.2d at 866-69. 
 216. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439. 
 217. Langeslag, 664 N.W.2d at 866-68. 
 218. Id. at 868-69. 
 219. Id. at 869 (citing Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 439). 
 220. Id. at 864. 
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evidence would be taken in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, Langeslag, and that the trial court’s ruling would 
have to be affirmed if “there was any competent evidence 
reasonably tending to sustain the verdict.”221  The court’s statement 
of the appropriate review standard, however, seems to be 
inconsistent with the “high threshold standard” the court actually 
applied in reviewing the evidence.222 
Eddy’s evidence that he suffered severe emotional distress 
because of Langeslag’s conduct consisted of his own testimony 
coupled with his medical records.223  Eddy testified to persistent 
stomach pain, hair loss, difficulty in sleeping, aggravation of his 
eczema and diabetes, and impotence.224  He also testified that his 
doctor had to prescribe antidepressants for him.225  His medical 
records indicated high work-related stress and skin problems, but 
the supreme court concluded that the records were insufficient to 
establish the necessary causation because of prior criminal 
problems that provided an alternative explanation for the stress.226  
Those symptoms pre-dated Langeslag’s police reports, which 
provided one of the bases for the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress claim.227  The eczema and diabetes were pre-
existing conditions and the court concluded that there was no 
evidence that they were specifically aggravated by Langeslag’s 
conduct.228  The court held that based on the evidence, the jury 
should not have been allowed to consider the emotional distress 
claim.229  Noting that Eddy’s claim involved “allegations of complex 
medical issues and issues of causation, possibly from multiple 
sources,” the court said that in such cases “testimony from the 
individual making the claim and inconclusive medical records are 
not sufficient to establish a causal connection between the conduct 
and the emotional distress.”230  Rather, the court said, “[t]he 
appropriate method of proving the severity and causation of 
 
 221. Id. (citing Navarre v. S. Wash. County Schs., 652 N.W.2d 9, 21 (Minn. 
2002)). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 869. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
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emotional distress is through medical testimony.”231 
The “high threshold standard of proof” required of a 
complainant in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases, as 
applied to the issue of whether emotional distress is sufficiently 
severe, translates in practice into a detailed examination of the 
facts to determine whether the case should be sent to a jury in the 
first place.232  The issue is whether that standard effectively applies 
in cases involving negligent infliction of emotional distress claims 
as well. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals considered the impact of the 
severity standard in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases 
on a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim in Quill v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc.233  The plaintiff, Abrahamson, a frequent 
business traveler, was a passenger on a TWA flight that suddenly 
rolled over and dropped more than 30,000 feet in forty seconds 
before the pilot regained control of the airplane.234  The airplane 
continued to shake and make substantial noise before landing forty 
minutes later.235  The plaintiff sought to recover for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress because of the impact the flight had 
on him.236  A frequent business traveler, the plaintiff experienced 
anxiety on half of the flights he took after the incident.237  The 
anxiety manifested itself in “adrenaline surges, sweaty hands, [and] 
elevated pulse and blood pressure.”238  On occasion he had to 
postpone flights because of that anxiety and it sometimes would 
take him two days to relax after a flight.239  The plaintiff, a non-
practicing physician, did not consult any medical professionals 
because he believed they would be unable to help him.240  A jury 
awarded the plaintiff $50,000 on his negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim.241  On appeal, TWA argued that the 
plaintiff had to meet Hubbard’s demanding standard for severe 
emotional distress.242  The court of appeals thought it doubtful that 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 864. 
 233. 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). 
 234. Id. at 440. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 441. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 440. 
 242. Id. at 442. 
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the plaintiff would meet that standard because of the lack of 
medical evidence to support his claim, but the court said that it was 
unnecessary to decide the issue because it concluded that the 
Hubbard standard was inapplicable in claims for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress: 
First, the supreme court did not state the independent 
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
displaced all other torts in which damages for emotional 
distress had been allowed.  Second, cases decided as 
recently as Langeland refer to physical symptoms without 
suggesting plaintiffs must meet the high threshold 
adopted in Hubbard.  Minnesota law has long separated 
the two emotional distress torts, not recognizing one until 
90 years after adopting the other.  We see little basis for 
borrowing an element from one to add to the other, 
particularly when the zone of danger rule provides an 
indicia of genuineness the intentional tort requirements 
lack.243 
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence the court noted 
that its “task is problematic for no clear line can be drawn between 
mental and physical injury,”244 but the court concluded that, given 
the unique circumstances of the accident, the plaintiff’s reaction, 
including sweaty hands, elevated blood pressure, and other 
evidence relating to fear of flying was sufficient to justify recovery.245 
In contrast, in State by Woyke v. Tonka Corp.,246 which arose out 
of claims by the plaintiffs related to the defendant’s disposal of 
hazardous waste on the plaintiffs’ property, the court of appeals 
held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover damages for 
emotional distress.247  The court’s summary of the evidence 
consisted of a complaint by Mrs. Woyke that her hair was falling out 
and that the children suffered more colds than previously.248  The 
court said that the trial court was properly skeptical of the 
subjective testimony of emotional distress in the absence of medical 
evidence.249  Citing Hubbard, the court of appeals noted the 
conspicuous absence of medical evidence and said that “[a]bsent 
 
 243. Id. at 443. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 443-44. 
 246. 420 N.W.2d 624 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 247. Id. at 629. 
 248. Id. at 627. 
 249. Id. 
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an objective showing of physical manifestations of emotional 
distress, a damage award for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress is not usually appropriate.”250 
The absence of medical testimony is not always the specific 
reason for the denial of recovery in negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims, however.  In Leaon v. Washington 
County,251 the plaintiff, a Washington County deputy sheriff, 
brought suit against the county and law enforcement personnel 
who were organizers of a stag party that got out of hand and 
resulted in his forced participation in acts that he found distressing 
and humiliating.252  The plaintiff sued for negligent and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, in addition to other theories.253 
One of the issues on appeal was whether the trial court erred 
in refusing to permit the plaintiff’s motion to add a claim for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress to his complaint.254  
Donald Leaon testified that “he lost weight (later regained), 
became depressed, and exhibited feelings of anger, fear, and 
bitterness.”255  The court simply held that those symptoms did not 
satisfy the physical manifestations test, without mentioning any 
necessity of medical testimony, citing, by way of comparison, the 
court of appeals decision in Quill.256 
The supreme court has referred to Quill on occasion, although 
perhaps not too much can be drawn from those references.257  It 
would be safe to say that it would be a mistake in cases involving 
negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress to seek 
recovery without medical evidence that establishes the link between 
the accident and the emotional distress and consequent physical 
symptoms.  And, notwithstanding the specifically articulated “high 
threshold” standard in the intentional infliction of emotional 
distress cases, the standards for severe emotional distress seem to 
bridge the two torts.258 
 
 250. Id. 
 251. 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1986). 
 252. Id. at 869. 
 253. Id. at 870. 
 254. Id. at 874-75. 
 255. Id. at 875. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See, e.g., K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1995); Dornfeld v. 
Oberg, 503 N.W.2d 115(Minn. 1993); Garvis v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 497 
N.W.2d 254 (Minn. 1993).   
 258. In Bowen v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 443 n.23 
(Wis. 1994), the Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically adopted the standard from 
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4.  Close Relationship to the Third-Party Victim 
The court in Engler v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.259 held that 
the plaintiff seeking to recover damages for emotional distress 
because of injury to a third person must be “closely related to the 
third-party victim.”260  As with the serious injury requirement, the 
court adopted the requirement to limit the liability of a negligent 
tortfeasor and to authenticate the plaintiff’s distress.261  The court 
did not further define the term, however, preferring to permit 
gradual common law development of the issue, and because the 
facts of the case, involving a mother-child relationship, would have 
satisfied even the most restrictive definitions of the term.262 
Justice Barry Anderson concurred in the court’s opinion, but 
wrote separately to express his view that the category of persons 
entitled to recover for fear for another’s safety should be more 
narrowly confined: 
In my view, the use of a “close relationship” test as set 
out in the majority opinion is a minimal, at best, 
limitation on NIED claims.  Not only does the majority 
formulation present the specter of the sudden discovery 
of a “close relationship” between previously distant 
parties, it also invites inquiry into, and controversy about, 
relationships thought to be “close,” e.g., a married couple 
experiencing conflict or sibling disputes of long-running 
duration.  Surely there will be requests by defense counsel 
for a special interrogatory on the jury verdict form to 
address the question of whether the plaintiff had the 
 
intentional infliction of emotional distress for negligence cases involving claims 
for emotional harm. 
 259. 706 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 2005). 
 260. Id. at 772.  The Minnesota Supreme Court and Minnesota Court of 
Appeals have permitted recovery under the Civil Damage Act, Minnesota Statutes 
section 340A.801, subdivision 1, when the person seeking recovery was not 
married to the person whose injury prompted the means of support claim under 
the Act.  See Lefto v. Hoggsbreath Enters., Inc., 581 N.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Minn. 
1998) (plaintiff and daughter, who were living with plaintiff’s  fiancé, entitled to 
recover for loss of means of support as a result of injuries to him); Skelly v. Mount, 
620 N.W.2d 566, 568-69 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (ex-wife who was living with her 
husband to help him with alcoholism held to be another person entitled to 
recover under the Civil Damage Act for loss of means of support due to her ex-
husband’s death).  Those cases would be irrelevant on the issue of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, however, because they involve the construction of 
a statute. 
 261. Engler, 706 N.W.2d at 772. 
 262. Id. 
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requisite “close relationship” to qualify for recovery. 
Instead, I would require that NIED claims be further 
limited to circumstances where the third-party victim is a 
spouse, parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, or sibling 
of the plaintiff.263 
He acknowledged that there is “some arbitrariness” in his 
approach, but thought that it was necessary to establish workable 
limits for the law of negligent infliction of emotional distress.264 
The court said that it agreed with decisions in other 
jurisdictions that have adopted a close relationship requirement, 
noting two decisions, Bovsun v. Sanperi,265 a New York Court of 
Appeals case, and Keck v. Jackson,266 an Arizona Supreme Court 
decision, although New York has adopted a narrower approach that 
limits recovery to certain family members and Keck has been 
interpreted to apply to familial or similar relationships.267  Bovsun 
held that a plaintiff in the zone of danger is entitled to recover 
“damages for injuries suffered in consequence of the observation of 
the serious injury or death of a member of his or her immediate 
family,” assuming the necessary causal connection between the 
damages and the defendant’s negligence.268  Subsequent decisions 
in New York have adhered to that limitation.  In Trombetta v. 
Conkling,269 the New York Court of Appeals refused to extend 
Bovsun to a case involving a negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for 
witnessing the death of her aunt, who was killed instantly when hit 
by a truck as the plaintiff was trying to pull her out of the path of 
the truck.270  The plaintiff was not physically injured or touched in 
the accident.271  The plaintiff’s mother had died when she was 
eleven and her aunt became the maternal figure in her life.272  They 
always lived close to each other and participated in activities 
together on a daily basis.273  The court of appeals held that she was 
 
 263. Id. (Anderson, Barry, J., concurring). 
 264. Id. at 772-73. 
 265. 461 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 1984). 
 266. 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979). 
 267. 706 N.W.2d at 772. 
 268. 461 N.E.2d at 848. 
 269. 626 N.E.2d 653 (N.Y. 1993). 
 270. Id. at 654. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
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not entitled to recover, limiting recovery as a matter of policy.274  
Aside from concerns about an unmanageable proliferation of 
claims, the court said that the restriction of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims “to a discrete readily determinable class 
also takes cognizance of the complex responsibility that would be 
imposed on the courts in this area to assess an enormous range and 
array of emotional ties of, at times, an attenuated or easily 
embroidered nature.”275 
More recently, the New York Supreme Court Appellate 
Division in Jun Chi Guan v. Tuscan Dairy Farms276 considered 
whether a grandmother was a member of the immediate family 
within the meaning of Bovsun.  The plaintiff was pushing her two-
and-a-half year old grandson in a carriage when both were allegedly 
hit by a truck owned by the defendant.277  The plaintiff was thrown 
in the air as a result of the collision.278  She suffered a broken thigh 
and other injuries.279  Her grandson died.280  The plaintiff provided 
full-time care for her grandson, six days a week.281  She argued that 
given the culture of the Chinese family, she was a member of her 
grandson’s “immediate family.”282  The appellate division rejected 
the claim, applying the Bovsun limitation.283 
Arizona, also a zone of danger jurisdiction, has similar 
limitations.  In Keck v. Jackson,284 the plaintiff and her mother were 
involved in an automobile accident that killed the plaintiff’s 
mother and caused serious injuries to the plaintiff.  The Arizona 
Supreme Court held that a person in the zone of danger could 
recover for emotional distress resulting “from witnessing an injury 
to a person with whom the plaintiff has a close personal 
relationship, either by consanguinity or otherwise.”285 
 
 274. Id. at 655. 
 275. Id. at 655-56. 
 276. 806 N.Y.S.2d 713 (App. Div. 2005). 
 277. Id. at 714. 
 278. Id. at 715-16 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
 279. Id. at 714, 716. 
 280. Id. at 714-15. 
 281. Id. at 716. 
 282. Id. at 714 (majority opinion). 
 283. Id. at 715. 
 284. 593 P.2d 668 (Ariz. 1979). 
 285. Id. at 670.  The court cited the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Leong 
v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974) as an example.  Hawaii is a bystander 
recovery jurisdiction.  See id. at 762 (citing Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 
1970) for the proposition that Hawaii permits claims of “negligently-inflicted 
mental distress unaccompanied by resulting physical injuries”).  The court in 
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Although the decision seems broad, particularly since it 
appears to extend beyond family relationships, the Arizona Court 
of Appeals read it more narrowly in Hislop v. Salt River Project 
Agricultural Improvement & Power District,286 a case involving claims by 
the plaintiffs for emotional distress they suffered as a result of 
seeing a friend and co-worker die by electrocution.  The resulting 
fireball also momentarily engulfed the plaintiffs, although they 
were not burned.287  The Hislop court interpreted Keck to mean that 
while a blood relationship is not necessarily required, “there must 
still be a familial relationship, or something closely akin” to it to 
justify recovery.288  Without deciding the outer limits of liability, and 
whether those limits were limited to the family relationships, the 
court held that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for 
witnessing injury to a co-worker and friend.289 
It would of course be a mistake to draw too much from the 
court’s references to Keck and Bovsun.  The court’s reference to 
those decisions does not mean that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
in Engler intended to apply the same approaches, nor does it mean 
that the court intended to reject those approaches.  The court 
clearly expressed its preference to instead let the law on the close 
relationship issue evolve on a case-by-case basis. 
One of the particularly interesting aspects of the New York 
decisions discussed above is that the plaintiffs in both cases were in 
the zone of danger, and the plaintiff in Jun Chi Guan was seriously 
injured, in the accidents that resulted in the injuries to or deaths of 
the closely related persons.290  New York courts denied recovery to a 
grandparent291 and niece,292 both of whom had close relationships 
to the accident victims.  In particular, as to the plaintiff in Jun Chi 
Guan, the issue is why the zone of danger rule should limit recovery 
 
Leong held that the absence of a blood relationship was not a bar to recovery by a 
ten-year-old boy for mental and emotional distress because of witnessing the death 
of his stepgrandmother.  Id. at 766.  In reaching its conclusion, the court 
emphasized both the unique nature of extended family relationships in Hawaii 
and also the unique Hawaiian concept of adoption.  See id. 
 286. 5 P.3d 267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). 
 287. Id. at 268. 
 288. Id. at 269. 
 289. Id. at 272. 
 290. Trombetta v. Conkling, 626 N.E.2d 653 (N.Y. 1993); Jun Chi Guan v. 
Tuscan Dairy Farms, 806 N.Y.S.2d 713 (App. Div. 2005) (grandmother who 
witnessed grandson’s death sustained a broken thigh and other injuries). 
 291. Jun Chi Guan, 806 N.Y.S.2d at 715. 
 292. Trombetta, 626 N.E.2d at 653-54. 
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in a case where the plaintiff has sustained personal injuries.  
Oklahoma, as an example, deals with those situations by classifying 
plaintiffs who suffer physical injury as direct victims who are then 
entitled to recover for all the emotional harm that flows from the 
accident.  In Kraszewski v. Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc.,293 
the plaintiff and his wife were holding hands and walking when 
they were hit by an intoxicated driver.  The husband was hit in the 
shoulder, chest, and knee.294  His wife was torn away from him and 
dragged down the street under the car that hit her.295  She died 
later in the day.296  He asserted claims for both intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.297  He was treated as a 
direct victim for purposes of the negligent infliction of emotional 
distress claim, which entitled him to recover damages resulting 
from fear for his wife’s safety, even though his injuries were 
slight.298 
In Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A.,299 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court noted that a person who suffers a 
physical injury because of a defendant’s negligence is entitled to 
recover for the accompanying mental anguish.300  The court viewed 
that sort of claim as separate from a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress where the plaintiff is in the zone of danger and 
suffers no physical injury.301  If the two categories of cases are kept 
separate, there should be no reason for the limiting rules from 
zone of danger cases to cross over and apply to what Oklahoma has 
called “direct victim” cases.302  This should be true even in cases 
where the plaintiff’s physical injuries are slight in comparison to 
the emotional damages suffered as a result of witnessing injury to a 
 
 293. 916 P.2d 241 (Okla. 1996). 
 294. Id. at 244. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at 244-45. 
 298. Id. at 247.  The jury found for the plaintiff but did not award him money 
damages for his injuries.  Id. at 247 n.16.  There are other examples.  E.g., 
Boryszewski v. Burke, 882 A.2d 410, 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(reinstating $5,000,000 damages awards by jury for each of three children whose 
mother was killed in a car accident that crushed her skull and slightly injured the 
children). 
 299. 556 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. 1996). 
 300. Id. at 560. 
 301. Id. 
 302. See, e.g., Kraszewski v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Okla., Inc., 916 P.2d 241, 246 
(Okla. 1996) (“Direct victims are those plaintiffs which are involved directly in an 
accident but whose emotional damages are caused by the suffering of another.”). 
05STEENSON.DOC 5/31/2006  1:11:09 PM 
1376 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
third person.  A good test of the rule would be the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals case, Carlson v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., in 
which the plaintiff sought recovery for witnessing the death of her 
best friend in an automobile accident.303  The plaintiff sustained 
serious injuries in a one-car rollover accident and her best friend 
died.304  The plaintiff was denied recovery for emotional harm from 
witnessing her friend’s death.305  While the court of appeals viewed 
the plaintiff’s right to recover for that emotional harm as a duty 
issue,306 Lickteig would appear to justify recovery because the 
plaintiff suffered physical injury. 
5.  Serious Bodily Injury to the Third-Party Victim 
Section 436 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts does not require 
actual injury to the third person.  It specifically applies where 
bodily harm to the plaintiff is caused by “shock or fright at harm or 
peril” to a member of the plaintiff’s immediate family.307  Minnesota 
deviates from the Restatement requirement in requiring death or 
serious bodily injury to the third-party victim.308 
IV.   MECHANICS OF SUBMITTING THE NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CASE TO A JURY 
There are two questions concerning the submission of 
negligent infliction of emotional distress cases to a jury.  One 
concerns the instructions and the other the supporting special 
verdict forms.  In a standard negligent infliction of emotional 
distress case there are four questions that have to be answered: (1) 
Was the plaintiff in the zone of danger of physical impact, or, in the 
alternative, was the plaintiff in actual physical danger in the 
accident?  (2) Did the plaintiff reasonably fear for her own safety?  
(3) Did the plaintiff suffer severe emotional distress?  (4) Did the 
severe emotional distress cause physical manifestations or 
symptoms?309 
In a case where the plaintiff suffers emotional distress as a 
result of witnessing injury to a third persons there are two 
 
 303. 520 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
 304. Id. at 535. 
 305. Id. at 538. 
 306. Id. at 537-38. 
 307. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (3) (1965) (emphasis added). 
 308. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 2005). 
 309. Id. at 770. 
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additional questions: (5) Is the plaintiff in a close relationship with 
the third-party victim?  (6) Did the defendant cause the third-party 
victim serious bodily injury or death?310  These issues would be in 
addition to the standard questions concerning negligence and 
direct cause,311 which would have to be answered affirmatively 
before the additional questions would be in issue. 
Questions one, two, four, and six could be the subject of 
special verdict questions without accompanying jury instructions.  
Question three—the “severe emotional distress” issue—likely needs 
to be defined for a jury.  And question five, the close relationship 
issue, could potentially be the subject of a jury instruction. 
The pattern Minnesota instruction covering intentional 
infliction of emotional distress states as an element that “the 
distress must have been so severe that no reasonable person could 
be expected to endure it.”312  The key issue is whether the severe 
emotional distress standards for intentional and negligent infliction 
of emotional distress are effectively the same.  There is also a 
question as to whether the standard should be further defined to 
provide greater guidance for a jury. 
The issue is handled differently, depending on the 
jurisdiction.  Ohio’s pattern instruction requires a showing of 
serious emotional distress, which it defines as follows: 
Serious emotional distress describes injury which is both 
severe and debilitating. It does not extend to mere insults, 
indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression or mere 
trivialities.  Thus, serious emotional distress may be found 
where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would 
be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress 
caused by the circumstances of the case.  It is mental 
anguish of a nature that no reasonable person could be 
expected to endure.  You may consider any evidence of a 
resulting physical condition in judging the degree of 
emotional distress suffered.313 
California also requires serious emotional distress.  The 
Judicial Council of California pattern instruction defines 
“emotional distress” to include “suffering, anguish, fright, horror, 
 
 310. Id. at 770-71. 
 311. See 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES—CIVIL 25.10, 27.10 
(4th ed. 1999). 
 312. Id. at 60.75.  The standard is drawn from Hubbard v. United Press 
International, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983). 
 313. 2 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS 219.05 (2002). 
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nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation, and shame,” 
and states that “[s]erious emotional distress exists if an ordinary, 
reasonable person would be unable to cope with it.”314 
Tennessee’s pattern instruction on negligent infliction of 
emotional distress requires the emotional injury to the plaintiff to 
be “serious or severe,” defined as “one which causes a reasonable 
person, normally constituted, to be unable to adequately cope with 
the mental stress arising from the circumstances of the event.”315  
The instruction also states that “[t]he emotional injury must be 
established by expert medical or scientific proof.”316 
The Pennsylvania pattern instructions offer two alternatives.  
The first alternative simply states that “[t]he plaintiff claims that 
the negligent conduct of the defendant caused [him] [her] to 
suffer emotional injuries.”317  The second, which defines what 
constitutes physical injury, is as follows: 
The plaintiff claims that [he] [she] was near the scene 
of an accident and observed injury to a close family 
member caused by the negligent conduct of the 
defendant, and that as a result [he himself] [she herself] 
suffered a physical injury in addition to [his] [her] 
emotional injuries. 
I will give you examples of injuries that are considered 
physical injuries.  These injuries include but are not 
limited to continued nausea or headaches, repeated 
hysterical attacks, insomnia, severe depression, 
nightmares, stress, nervousness, or anxiety.318 
The South Carolina pattern instructions state that “the 
emotional distress must both manifest itself by physical symptoms 
capable of objective diagnosis and be established by expert 
testimony.”319 
Delaware, a zone of danger jurisdiction, has two pattern 
instructions, one for cases where the plaintiff is in the zone of 
danger and seeks recovery for his or her emotional distress and the 
other where the claim is for fright or severe emotional distress 
 
 314. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1621 (2006). 
 315. 8 TENNESSEE PRACTICE PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS T.P.I.-CIV. 4.36B 
(2005). 
 316. Id. 
 317. PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.07 
(2003). 
 318. Id. 
 319. ANDERSON’S SOUTH CAROLINA REQUESTS TO CHARGE—CIVIL § 29-1 (2002). 
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suffered because of witnessing injury to a close relative.  The first 
instruction simply states that “[i]f someone’s negligence causes 
fright or severe emotional distress to a person within the immediate 
area of physical danger created by that negligence, and if the 
person suffers physical consequences as a result of that severe 
emotional distress, then the injured person may recover 
damages.”320 
The second instruction, where the injury is to a close relative, 
and the plaintiff is in the zone of danger, reads as follows: 
A person may recover damages for fright or severe 
emotional distress suffered as a result of witnessing an 
injury negligently caused to a close relative only if: 
(1) the person was in the immediate area of physical 
danger created by the negligent party; and 
(2) the person suffered physical injury as a result of the 
emotional distress. 
If you find that [plaintiff’s name] suffered severe 
emotional distress and then physical injury from 
witnessing [__describe negligent act to a close relative__] 
and that [plaintiff’s name] was within an immediate area 
of physical danger created by [defendant’s name]’s 
negligence, then [defendant’s name] is liable for 
damages.321 
It would seem to be unnecessary to tell a jury that the physical 
symptoms or emotional injury have to be established by medical or 
expert or scientific evidence, as in the South Carolina and 
Tennessee instructions.  That issue should be a threshold issue for 
the court to decide in determining whether to permit a negligent 
infliction of emotional distress case to go to a jury in the first place.  
The issue of whether there has to be a lengthier explanation of 
what constitutes severe emotional distress is a separate question.  
Providing examples of physical symptoms or injuries might be 
helpful to a jury.  The Pennsylvania instruction does that, but the 
heavily fact-dependent determination of what physical symptoms 
are sufficient may caution against trying to define the term.  Once 
again, the trial court will have to determine whether the plaintiff’s 
evidence of physical symptoms is sufficient to submit to the jury.  
The jury’s function would be to determine whether the plaintiff in 
 
 320. SUPERIOR COURT OF DELAWARE ONLINE CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
COMPLETE & ANNOTATED § 14.3 (2000). 
 321. Id. at § 14.4. 
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fact exhibited physical symptoms and whether they were caused by 
the emotional distress. 
Minnesota law would require a special verdict question on the 
issue of whether the plaintiff’s distress is severe.  If the pattern 
instruction on intentional infliction of emotional distress is 
followed,322 the jury would be instructed that the distress would 
have to be “so severe that no reasonable person could be expected 
to endure it,”323 a definition that comes from the intentional 
infliction of emotional distress cases.  If in fact physical symptoms 
are required, a second question would ask the jury whether the 
distress directly caused physical symptoms.  The trial judge would 
presumably be the gatekeeper on that issue, as well as the issue of 
whether medical evidence established those symptoms.  In most 
cases it will be a requirement, unless there is an extraordinary 
combination of circumstances, as in the Quill case, where recovery 
would be permitted without that showing.324 
The close relationship issue may be the subject of a special 
verdict question.325  Justice Barry Anderson, concurring in Engler, 
thought that it would.326  There will always be pressure to adopt a 
bright line approach to the issue,327 but even in cases where there is 
a brighter line defining the relationships that will justify recovery 
the quality of the relationship may present an issue that has bearing 
on the damages the plaintiff claims. 
If the close relationship issue is left open, there is an issue of 
establishing guidelines to assist in making that determination.  This 
is especially true since the supreme court has not yet indicated the 
parameters of the relationship necessary to support recovery by a 
plaintiff in a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim where 
 
 322. 4A MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES—CIVIL 60.75 (4th ed. 
1999). 
 323. Id. 
 324. Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(where the plaintiff was involved in the severe loss of control of an airplane).  For 
discussion, see supra notes 233-45 and accompanying text. 
 325. See generally Howard H. Kestin, The Bystander’s Cause of Action for Emotional 
Injury: Reflections on the Relational Eligibility Standard, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 512 
(1996) (discussing the requirements relating to the relationship between the 
emotionally distressed bystander and the physically injured party in emotional 
distress cases). 
 326. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 772 (Minn. 2005) 
(Anderson, Barry, J., concurring). 
 327. See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588 (Cal. 1988); Dunphy v. 
Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994). 
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she is claiming damages arising from witnessing injury to a third 
party. 
New Jersey law provides an example of what could evolve in 
Minnesota.  The New Jersey guidelines for emotional distress in 
bystander cases require a plaintiff to prove “a marital or intimate, 
familial relationship between the plaintiff and the injured 
person.”328  That grouping potentially includes co-habitants, 
fiancés, as well as others with strong emotional bonds.329  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court established guidelines for determining 
whether the relationship is sufficiently close: 
We acknowledge that this critical determination must be 
guided as much as possible by a standard that focuses on 
those factors that identify and define the intimacy and 
familial nature of such a relationship.  That standard must 
take into account the duration of the relationship, the 
degree of mutual dependence, the extent of common 
contributions to a life together, the extent and quality of 
shared experience, and, as expressed by the Appellate 
Division, “whether the plaintiff and the injured person 
were members of the same household, their emotional 
reliance on each other, the particulars of their day to day 
relationship, and the manner in which they related to 
each other in attending to life’s mundane 
requirements.”330 
The New Jersey Supreme Court thought it a jury issue: “Our 
courts have shown that the sound assessment of the quality of 
interpersonal relationships is not beyond a jury’s ken and that 
courts are capable of dealing with the realities, not simply the 
legalities, of relationships to assure that resulting emotional injury 
is genuine and deserving of compensation.”331 
The alternative is for a court to determine whether a particular 
relationship is sufficiently close to justify submitting the damages 
issue to the jury.  The quality of the relationship will then be 
assessed by the jury in determining the damages to which the 
plaintiff is entitled for emotional distress.  It is not clear which 
position the supreme court will take on the issue, of course. 
 
 328. Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 528 (N.J. 1980). 
 329. Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 380. 
 330. Id. at 378 (citing Dunphy v. Gregor, 617 A.2d 1248, 1255 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1992)). 
 331. Id. 
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V.   CONCLUSION 
The Minnesota rules governing recovery for emotional distress 
are for the most part well settled.  The supreme court has adhered 
to the basic zone of danger rule adopted in Purcell332 for some one 
hundred and fourteen years.333  The court has indicated that it has 
been cautious in its approach to recovery for emotional harm.334  Its 
decisions certainly bear out that observation. 
The zone of danger rule, once a progressive rule when it was 
adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Purcell, is now 
overshadowed by the bystander recovery rule, which has been 
adopted by most jurisdictions considering the issue.  The court 
took the opportunity in Engler to reaffirm that rule, as did the 
predecessor court in Stadler over twenty years earlier. 
Engler is a limited decision, however.  It doesn’t profess to be 
anything else.  The damages recoverable in a zone of danger case 
are expanded only slightly by the decision, although the expansion 
seems to be perfectly consistent with previously settled law in 
Minnesota permitting recovery for all the direct consequences of a 
personal injury. 
In a sense, one might ask what’s the fuss?  The decision to 
permit the plaintiff to recover damages for witnessing what could 
have been fatal injury to her son doesn’t open the floodgates and it 
doesn’t mean the legal sky is falling.  Allowing someone who is in 
the zone of danger to recover for the direct consequences of a 
defendant’s negligence isn’t equivalent to permitting bystander 
recovery, even without the close relationship requirement that the 
court in Engler imposed as a limitation on recovery.  The court 
seemed to implicitly recognize that severe and undifferentiated 
emotional distress flows from involvement in a catastrophic 
occurrence. 
Application of the Engler rules may be problematic, but they 
are not unworkable.  The range of special verdict questions and 
potential jury instructions that will be necessary to apply the rules 
in zone of danger cases is relatively limited.  The broader questions 
concerning the fairness and utility of the basic zone of danger rules 
will await another day. 
 
 332. Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892). 
 333. Engler v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 706 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Minn. 2005) (citing 
Purcell, 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 and discussing it as the standard for over 100 
years). 
 334. Navarre v. S. Wash. County Schs., 652 N.W.2d 9, 30 (Minn. 2002). 
